The Logical Completeness of Legal Facts in the Modern Jurisprudence A Comparative Analytical Study
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31185/lark.Vol1.Iss44.2077Keywords:
فلسفة القانون, القانون واللغة, مذاهب التفسير القضائي, المعنى في فلسفة القانونAbstract
There had been almost a consensus among jurists that the legal system is a logically complete, consistent hierarchy of facts until the twentieth century. Jurists of such tradition also tend to emphasize the determinacy of the meaning. They view meaning as an independent entity to which legal text refers from the outside. Therefore, meaning had always been a matter of discovery, not creation. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, legal scholarship has witnessed an emergence of jurisprudential schools that have popularized the view that legal facts are far from consistent or complete. Some scholars have even gone further to prompt contradiction over consistency, the multiplicity of metanarratives over sweeping narratives, ambiguity over determinacy of the meaning.
This development in legal thoughts directly resulted from the linguistic turn philosophy that shifted the focus from epistemology to the philosophy of language. Such change intensified the interest in the relationship between language and meaning, significantly impacting legal thoughts.
This article seeks to trace back the most important philosophical themes that had more significant impacts on legal schools. However, the paper will give special attention to the emergence of the philosophy of language as a considerable force with an immense influence on many jurists. The interest in language by jurists has led to a revolt against the well-established traditions of logical completeness and consistency of the legal facts. Such transformation led to the rise of a school of jurisprudence leaning toward pluralism, the multiplicity of narratives, the role of language in shaping the meaning of the world.
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